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| Registros recuperados: 40 | |
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| Boxall, Peter C.; Perger, Orsolya; Packman, Katherine. |
| Conservation auctions (CA) are typically employed to increase the provision of Ecological Goods and Services (EG&S) for achieving environmental goals. This paper exmaines the ability of a CA to meet an environmental target. Previous research on this topic used the number of contracts as a target rather than some specified environmental goal. We used experimental economic methods benchmarked to a wetlands restoration case study to examine a target constraint that must be met by bidders rather than a budget constraint. However, since no budget constraint is employed, agencies with limited resources might have to use other auction design procedures to ensure that financial outlays to pay winning bidders are not too high while meeting the target.... |
| Tipo: Working Paper |
Palavras-chave: Conservation auctions; Environmental target; Experimental economics; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q52; Q58; D44. |
| Ano: 2012 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/121624 |
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| Schamel, Guenter. |
| We present a first analysis of auction markets for specialty food products. We identify auction prices, trade volume and value for domestic and foreign origin specialty ham with geographical indications (GIs) which were actually sold in online auctions in Germany within a one-month period. Applying hedonic modeling, we examine potential factors that may influence online bidding behavior and final auction prices. We estimate positive auction price effects for weight, bidding activity, and auction length, that the domestic product is sold at a discount, that higher shipping cost have a negative impact on final prices, and that auctions ending on Fridays and Saturdays yield lower prices. The model may be used to estimate the value of GIs. In our example, we... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Consumer economics; Geographical indications; Auctions; Information; Marketing; D12; D44; D83. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25606 |
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| Dosi, Cesare; Moretto, Michele. |
| We study the competition to acquire the exclusive right to operate an infrastructure service, by comparing two different specifications for the financial proposals - "lowest price to consumers" vs "highest concession fee", and two alternative contractual arrangements: a contract which imposes the obligation to immediately undertake the investment required to operate the concessioned service and a contract which simply assigns to the winning bidder the right to supply the market at a date of her choosing. By comparing the returns of these alternative award criteria and concessioning conditions, we show that concessioning without imposing rollout time limits may or may not provide a higher expected social value, depending on the bidding rule used to allocate... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Concessions; Auctions; Award criteria; Service Rollout Time limits; Public Economics; L51; D44; D92. |
| Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50409 |
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| Nielsen, Kurt. |
| Payment entitlements is a new commodity that arises from the new European common agricultural policy. The agricultural subsidies are decoupled from the actual production and replaced by the so-called payment entitlements. A payment entitlement has a farm specific value and may be freely traded. This paper discusses the complexity of this new market and suggests an auction that simplifies the complexity. The suggested auction allows a buyer to simultaneously bid on all payment entitlements. The prices are found by a tatonnement that monotonically approximates the equilibrium prices for the different types of payment entitlements for sale. The auction enhances the competition and efficiency of the market, which is essential for the individual members of the... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Auction; Multiple goods; Bidding agents; Tatonnement; Agricultural subsidies; Agricultural Finance; D44; Q13. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/24566 |
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| Albano, Gian Luigi; Dini, Federico; Zampino, Roberto. |
| Competitive bidding (as auctions) is commonly used to procure goods and services. Public buyers are often mandated by law to adopt competitive procedures to ensure transparency and promote full competition. Recent theoretical literature, however, suggests that open competition can perform poorly in allocating complex projects. In exploring the determinants of suppliers’ bidding behavior in procurement auctions for complex IT services, we find results that are consistent with theory. We find that price and quality do not exhibit the classical tradeoff one would expect: quite surprisingly, high quality is associated to low prices. Furthermore, while quality is mainly driven by suppliers’ experience, price is affected more by the scoring rule and by the level... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Procurement Auctions; Scoring Rules; IT Contracts; Price/Quality Ratio; Demand and Price Analysis; D44; D86; H51; H57. |
| Ano: 2008 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/46547 |
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| Klonner, Stefan. |
| A bidding rotating savings and credit association (Rosca) is modeled as a sequence of symmetric-independent-private-value auctions with price-proportional benefits to bidders. We estimate a structural econometric model which, by introducing an altruistic component into each bidder's utility function, allows for socially favorable deviations from the private information, non-altruistic bidding equilibrium. We find that bidding is more altruistic in groups managed by experienced organizers and in Roscas whose current members have already run through more than one Rosca cycle of the current group, implying that effective leadership and enduring relationships help mitigate the social cost of strategic behavior. When a bidder has to meet an unforeseen... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Roscas; Auctions; Consumer/Household Economics; D44; G20. |
| Ano: 2003 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28449 |
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| Dosi, Cesare; Moretto, Michele. |
| We study the competition to operate an infrastructure service by developing a model where firms must report a two-dimensional sealed bid: the price to consumers and the concession fee paid to the government. Two bidding rules are considered in this paper. One rule consists of awarding the concession to the firm that reports the lowest price. The other consists of granting the franchise to the bidder offering the highest fee. We compare the outcome of these rules with reference to two alternative concession arrangements. The former imposes the obligation to immediately undertake the investment required to roll-out the service. The latter allows the concessionaire to optimally decide the investment timing. The focus is on the effect of bidding rules and... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Concessions; Auctions; Bidding Rules; Managerial Flexibility; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; L51; D44; D92. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6630 |
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| Kawasaki, Kentaro; Fujie, Takeshi; Koito, Kentaro; Inoue, Norikazu; Sasaki, Hiroki. |
| Poster prepared for presentation at the Agricultural & Applied Economics Association 2010 AAEA,CAES, & WAEA Joint Annual Meeting, Denver, Colorado, July 25-27, 2010. |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Auctions; Conservation contracting; Compliance; Environmental Economics and Policy; C91; D44; Q24. |
| Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/61188 |
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| Packman, Katherine; Boxall, Peter C.. |
| Currently, the effect of human impact on the environment is becoming increasingly apparent. The encroachment of human activity has inevitably resulted in the loss or impairment of ecological goods and services (EG&S) around the globe as well as in our own backyard. EG&S include features such as wildlife habitat, biodiversity, soil renewal, or nutrient cycling. The loss of such features has become a sobering reality for Manitobans in the face of the utrophication of Lake Winnipeg as a result of practices contributing to nutrient loading into the lake. Since EG&S are very important to Manitobans, efforts are being made to explore different vehicles to encourage their provision. In order to address some of the environmental issues transpiring in... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Market based instruments; Conservation auction; Tender; Wetland restoration; Environmental Economics and Policy; D44; Q20; Q57. |
| Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/91423 |
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| Colson, Gregory; Huffman, Wallace E.. |
| Early GM traits were obtained by transferring genes across species, largely from soil bacteria. Part of the consumer resistance to them has been their transgenic nature. Recently, breakthroughs have occurred using intragenic bioengineering where genes are moved long distances within a specie, for example in potato, and without antibiotic markers. The objective of this research is to assess consumers’ acceptance and willingness to pay (WTP) for new intragenic fresh potato, tomato, and broccoli with higher levels of antioxidants and vitamin C, which are consumer traits. To elicit consumer valuations, a new series of experimental auctions were conducted in 2007 that built upon methodology developed in our earlier research. WTP was assessed in a multi-round... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: GM foods; Consumer attributes; Willingness to pay; Economics experiments; Consumer/Household Economics; Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety; Q10; D11; D82; D44. |
| Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/49986 |
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| Forges, Francoise; Orzach, Ram. |
| In a common value auction in which the information partitions of the bidders are connected, all rings are core-stable. More precisely, the ex ante expected utilities of rings, at the (noncooperative) sophisticated equilibrium proposed by Einy, Haimanko, Orzach and Sela (Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2002), describe a cooperative game, in characteristic function form, in spite of the underlying strategic externalities. A ring is core-stable if the core of this characteristic function is not empty. Furthermore, every ring can implement its sophisticated equilibrium strategy by means of an incentive compatible mechanism. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Auctions; Bayesian Game; Collusion; Core; Partition Form Game; Characteristic Function; Environmental Economics and Policy; C71; C72; D44. |
| Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/96668 |
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| Vukina, Tomislav; Levy, Armando; Marra, Michele C.. |
| The paper uses data from the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) auctions to elicit farmers' attitudes toward the environment by analyzing their bids. The CRP pays farmers to remove land from production and put it to a conservation use. An interesting aspect of these auctions is that winners are determined by a combination of low bids and environmental scores of individual plots. The results indicate that farmers condition their bids on the strength of their environmental scores and that they consistently value those environmental improvements which are concentrated locally such as reduced soil erosion, while they place less emphasis on those benefits which resemble public goods such as air quality and wildlife habitat. |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy; D44; D82; Q51; Q58. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25233 |
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| Registros recuperados: 40 | |
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